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:

Plaintiff and Appellant,

:
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.

:

AT&T COMMUNICATIONS OF THE
MOUNTAIN STATES, INC.;
CATHY BATESON: LOUISE
JOHNSON: VICKIE RANDALL:
DOE I THROUGH DOE X,
Defendants and Appellees.

:

Case No.

890464

:

Priority No. 16

:
:

* * * * * * * * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has .jurisdiction of this Appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Sec. 78-2-2 (.j) and Rule 3 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Does Utah recognize a cause of action for wrongful

termination in violation of public policy?

The District Court's

determination of this issue constitutes a legal conclusion and

is reviewable under the correction of error standard of review.
Arnold v. Titan Services Company, 121 UAR 4, 5 (Utah, 1989) *
2c

Does Utah allow a cause of action for wrongful

termination in violation of public policy only for at will
employees?

The District Court's determination of this issue

•constitutes a legal conclusion, and is reviewable under the
correction of error standard of review.
3.

Id.

Are Plaintiff's claims for wrongful termination

and negligent employment pre-empted by Federal or State AntiDiscrimination Statutes?

The District Court's determination

of this issue constitutes et legal conclusion, and is reviewable under the correction of error standard of review.
4.
Law?

Id.

Are Plaintiff's claims pre-empted by Federal Labor

The District Court's determination of this issue con-

stitutes a legal conclusion, and is reviewable under the
correction of error standard of review.
5.

Id.

Are Plaintiff's claims barred for failure to exhaust

contractual remedies?

The District Court's determination of

this issue constitutes a lejgal conclusion, and is reviewable
under the correction of error standard of review.
6.

Id.

Are Plaintiff's claims for negligent employment,

breach of implied contract,, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress barred by limitations?

The District

Court's determination of this issue constitutes a legal

- 2 -

conclusion, and is reviewable under the correction of error
standard of review.
7.

Id.

Has Plaintiff stated a claim against the individual

Defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress?
The District Court's determination of this issue at least
arguably constitutes a finding of fact.

However, inasmuch

as such finding was made pursuant to a Motion for Summary
Judgment, it is reviewable under the correction of error
standard of review.

Utah State Coalition of Senior

Citizens v. Utah Power & Light Company, 776 P.2d 632,
634 (Utah, 1989).
8.

Has Plaintiff stated a claim against the indivi-

dual Defendants for interference with contractual relations?
The District Court's determination of this issue at least
arguably constitutes a finding of fact.

However, inasmuch

as such finding was made pursuant to a Motion for Summary
Judgment, it is reviewable under the correction of error
standard of review.

Id.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES

This Court's interpretation of Utah Code Annotated,
Section 34-35-7.1(11) may be dispositive of certain issues on
this Appeal.

That section provides:
The procedures contained in this section and
Section 34-35-8 are the exclusive remedy under
state law for employment discrimination because
of race, color, age, religion, national origin,
or handicap.
- 3 -

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff commenced this action in the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on April 5,
1989.

Plaintiff's Verified Complaint (R. 2-22) alleges causes

of action against AT&T for wrongful termination, breach of
implied contract, and negligent employment, and against each
of the named individual Defendants for intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and interference with contractual
relations.

Plaintiff's Verified Complaint also includes a

cause of action against JoLene Gailey for invasion of privacy.
On May 18, 1989, JoLene Gailey was dismissed, without
prejudice, as a defendant in this action as a result of
Gailey's having filed a Chapter 7 Petition in Bankruptcy
on February 15, 1989.
On June 1, 1989, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss all of the claims alleged within Plaintiff's Verified
Complaint on various grounds.

Following the submission of

Affidavits and Legal Memoranda by both parties, the District
Court, per the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, issued its
Minute Entry, dated September 5, 1989, which treated Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as a Motion for Summary Judgment, and
granted said Motion in its entirety, "for the reasons specified
in the memoranda in support thereof."

(R. 318). An Order to

the same effect was signed by Judge Frederick on December 6,

_ 4 .

1989, (R. 324-25), which constitutes the final Order from
which this Appeal is taken.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiff was initially employed as a telephone

operator by Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company
in Grand Junction, Colorado, during April, 1976, (R. 205).
2.

During February, 1983, pursuant to the nationwide

divestiture of AT&T, Plaintiff transferred to the "Wasatch
Office" of AT&T, located in Salt Lake City, Utah, where
Plaintiff continued her employment with AT&T as a telephone
operator.
3.

(R. 205).
Subsequent to Plaintiff1s transfer to the Wasatch

Office, Plaintiff became aware that sexually-oriented conduct
and communications were common-place at the Wasatch Office.
(R. 205).
4.

Shortly after Plaintiff's transfer to the Wasatch

Office, Plaintiff was contacted by her Manager, Fayonne
Johanneson, for the purpose of discussing the employees'
Code of Conduct published by AT&T. (R. 115-140).

During

such conversation, Plaintiff was required to sign an entry
in her work records indicating that she had discussed and
understood the contents of said Code of Conduct.

Such pro-

cedure was repeated on a yearly basis, with Plaintiff discussing the Code of Conduct with whomever was her manager

- 5 -

at the time.

While certain minor revisions to the Code of

Conduct were made from year to year, upon information and
belief, the provisions concerning sexual harassment and
retaliation, and designating AT&T's EEO Coordinator's Office
as a procedure for remedying such conduct, remained the same
throughout Plaintiff's employment with AT&T.

Upon further

information and belief, all telephone operators of AT&T were
required to review and endorse the Code of Conduct on a yearly
basis as a condition of their continued employment with AT&T.
(R. 205-206).
5.

During approximately June, 1983, Plaintiff began

working the night shift at the Wasatch Office, in order to be
able to spend more time with her daughter during the days.
(R. 206).
6.

Shortly after Plaintiff's transfer to night shift,

Plaintiff began to be subjected to advances from Joiene Gailey
(hereinafter referred to as Gailey), who was at all times
material hereto an employee of Defendant AT&T sit the Wasatch
Office, which included a gradually increasing number of
comments by Gailey concerning Plaintiff's appearance, suggestions that Plaintiff Join Gailey in various activities,
and physical touching.
7.

(R. 206-207).

At approximately the same time as the commencement

of Gailey's conduct toward Plaintiff referred to in the preceding paragraph, certain other employees of the Wasatch

- 6 -

Office, including Defendants Johnson and Randall, who were,
upon information and belief, personal friends of Gailey, began
to congregate around Plaintiff with regularity.

Such employees

frequently conversed explicitly upon subjects of a sexual
and/or homosexual nature.
8.

(R. 207).

During approximately July, 1983, Defendant Johnson

was overheard by Plaintiff and, upon information and belief,
by several other employees of the Wasatch Office, loudly describing in explicit detail a sexual encounter that she had
allegedly had with a male employee of the Wasatch Office.
(R. 206).
9.

On or about November 22, 1984, Gailey, who was

visibly intoxicated at the time, sat next to Plaintiff at work
and stated words to the effect of "I'm going to save you from
Dave Todd."

On this occasion, Gailey placed her hand upon

Plaintiff's arm in an affectionate manner, which greatly
offended Plaintiff.
10.

(R. 207).

Subsequent to November 22, 1984, the aforemen-

tioned pattern of conduct perpetrated upon Plaintiff by Gailey
became progressively more aggressive, to the point where,
during approximately December of 1984, Gailey asked Plaintiff
to pose nude while Gailey prepared a picture or sculpture.
(R. 207).
11.

Shortly following the incident referred to in the

preceding paragraph, Gailey, on a separate occasion, told

- 7 -

Plaintiff that she (Gailey) needed to find a roommate, and
that she hated men and even the sound of men's voices on
the telephone.

When Plaintiff did not respond to these

statements by Gailey, Gailey grabbed Plaintiff,fs arm and
said words to the effect of, "Debi, why don't you talk to
me?"

(R. 207-208).
12.

During approximately December, 1983, Plaintiff

was appointed Union Steward of the Communications Workers of
America ("CWA") at the Wasatch Office.

Upon information and

belief, CWA was at all times material hereto the exclusive
bargaining agent for telephone operators of AT&T.
13.

(R. 208).

During approximately December, 1983, Plaintiff

was telephoned at her residence by Gailey.

Upon information

and belief, said telephone call was made by Gailey from the
Wasatch Office during her working hours.
14.

(R. 208).

During approximately January, 1984, a male

employee of the Wasatch Office passed a note to Plaintiff,
which note stated that Plaintiff was having an affair with
a certain other male employee.

Upon information and belief,

Gailey was the originator of the allegation contained within
the note.
15.

(R. 208).
During approximately March, 1984, Gailey tele-

phoned Plaintiff at Plaintiff's residence and asked Plaintiff
if she intended to file an EEOC Complaint against Gailey.
Such inquiry was made by Gailey, upon information and belief,

- 8 -

pursuant to instructions of Defendant Bateson-Hough.

Plain-

tiff responded to this inquiry of Gailey by stating that
Plaintiff would file an EEOC Complaint if Gailey continued
to bother Plaintiff.

Plaintiff further informed Gailey

during this conversation that Plaintiff had been offended
by Gailey's asking Plaintiff to pose nude.

Gailey stated

in response to Plaintiff's comments words to the effect of,
"I'm sorry if I offended you, but I feel I shouldn't
apologize for my sexuality."
16.

(R. 208-209).

Subsequent to the telephone conversation referred

to in the preceding paragraph, Gailey and certain other
employees of the Wasatch Office, including the individual
Defendants herein, commenced upon a regular practice of
retaliation and harassment of Plaintiff, which included,
inter alia, staring at and making threatening facial expressions at Plaintiff, walking close to Plaintiff, following
Plaintiff, and talking about Plaintiff amongst themselves.
On one occasion during approximately March, 1984, Plaintiff
became so upset by this conduct that she was required to
leave work early.
17.

(R. 209).

During approximately March, 1984, Plaintiff, on

two separate occasions, complained verbally to Supervisor
Hilda Shelley, and Manager Al Reynolds, concerning the
harassment and retaliation referred to in the preceding
paragraph.

(R. 209).

- 9 -

18•

On or about May 8, 1984, Gailey assumed a posi-

tion immediately next to PLaintiff on the stand-up computer
boards at a time when many other positions were available.
Plaintiff immediately moved to another position.

Within

approximately 10 minutes thereafter, Gailey moved to a
different position.
19.

(R. 209).

On or about May 9, 1984, Plaintiff wrote and

delivered to Bateson-Hough a letter stating that Gailey had
continued harassing Plaintiff in spite of Plaintiff's requests
to Gailey that she not do so.
20.

(R. 210).

On or about May 10, 1984, Plaintiff submitted a

written complaint to the office of the EEO Coordinator for
AT&T concerning Gailey's harassment of Plaintiff.
21.

(R. 210).

On or about May 15, 1984, Plaintiff received a

telephone call at her residence from Richard Salazar, who
was at that time, upon information and belief, an employee
of AT&T and a Union Steward of CWA.

During the ensuing tele-

phone conversation, Salazar stated to Plaintiff words to the
effect of,

"You're the new kid on the block —

going to win this.

you're not

We don't know you very well, but we do

know Jolene, she is a respectable person in the community
and an artist" and "Somebody could get fired over this."
(R. 210).
22.

On or about May 31, 1984, at approximately

1:15 a.m., Gailey drove her vehicle at a high rate of speed
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past Plaintiff while Plaintiff was attempting to cross
the street to her vehicle.

Gailey then proceeded to follow

Plaintiff south on 1-15 to the 13th South exit.
23.

(R. 210).

During June, 1984, the EEO Coordinator's Office

for AT&T, per Linda Johnston, who was at that time, upon
information and belief, a personal friend of Bateson-Hough,
conducted an investigation into Plaintiff's written complaint
filed on or about May 10, 1984.

Said investigation, upon

information and belief, consisted wholly of personal interviews of Plaintiff and Gailey, and the submission of written
statements by Plaintiff and Gailey.
24.

(R. 210-211).

During approximately June, 1984, Plaintiff par-

ticipated in a conversation with Darlene Anderson, who was at
that time, upon information and belief, a first-level manager
at the Wasatch Office.

Said conversation included a discus-

sion of Plaintiff's problems with Gailey, in regard to which
Anderson stated to Plaintiff words to the effect of, "Just be
careful what you say and do; this is a strong and big group
that you are dealing with."
25.

(R. 211).

On or about July 10, 1984, the EEO Coordinator's

Office for AT&T, per Linda Johnston, submitted its report and
recommendation in regard to Plaintiff's written complaint of
May 10, 1984.

Said report recommended that Plaintiff and

Gailey have as little contact with each other as possible in
the future.

(R. 211).
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26.

During approximately July, 1984, following the

issuance of the report by the EEO Coordinator for AT&T,
Plaintiff received a telephone call from Reta Pehrson, who
was, upon information and belief, at that time a supervisor
for AT&T and Vice President of Telephone Operators for CWA.
During this conversation, Pehrson stated to Plaintiff words
to the effect of "You have to be satisfied with the EEO's
decision" and "If anybody asks you about it, don't tell them
and don't say anything."
27.

(R. 211-212).

During approximately July, 1984, Plaintiff over-

heard an employee of the Wasatch Office, who was at that time
engaged in a conversation with two other employees, including
Defendant Johnson, state words to the effect of, "Debi would
make a good stripper -- she has big boobs."

Immediately

following said statement, Johnson stated, while looking
directly at Plaintiff, words to the effect of, "My bra size
is 34B."
28.

(R. 212).
Subsequent to the issuance of the EEO Coor-

dinator's report on or about July 10, 1984, Gailey and
her friends at the Wasatch office, including Defendants
Johnson and Randall, continued to stare at and make hostile
facial expressions toward Plaintiff, to follow Plaintiff,
to walk and sit close to Plaintiff, and to talk about Plaintiff amongst themselves.

On one occasion during approxi-

mately August, 1984, an employee of the Wasatch Office,
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stated to Plaintiff words to the effect of, "Debi, they*re
all staring at you."
29.

(R. 212).

On or about August 9, 1984, Plaintiff witnessed

a female employee of the Wasatch Office grab Defendant
Johnson's crotch from behind.

Upon information and belief,

Johnson was employed as a supervisor at the Wasatch Office
at the time of this incident.
30.

(R. 212).

On or about August 30, 1984, Plaintiff filed a

charge letter with the EEOC, alleging, in summary, that
Plaintiff had been harassed by some of her co-workers during
the preceding year, and that AT&T Management had done nothing
to remedy the situation despite repeated complaints by Plaintiff.

(R. 212-213).
31.

During approximately November, 1984, Plaintiff

received a telephone call at her residence from Alfred A.
Aros, who was at that time, upon information and belief, an
investigator for the EEOC.

During the ensuing telephone con-

versation, Aros stated to Plaintiff that three of the four
witnesses whom Aros had interviewed concerning Plaintiff's
allegations of harassment, had indicated that there was a
"lesbian problem" at the Wasatch Office. Aros further advised
Plaintiff that he intended to issue a warning to AT&T
Management concerning that problem.
32.

(R. 213).

During approximately November of 1984, the Office

of the EEO Coordinator for AT&T administered a survey to the
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employees of the Wasatch Office concerning sexually oriented
behavior at the work place.

On the same day, the Coordin-

ator's Office provided a lecture and film concerning sexual
harassment in the work place to the employees of the Wasatch
Office.

(R. 213).
33.

On or about December 29, 1984, Gailey and Defen-

dant Johnson, together with one other employee of the Wasatch
Office, engaged in a conversation within hearing of Plaintiff.
During said conversation, Plaintiff and Gailey made eye contact,
whereupon Gailey stated to Plaintiff words to the effect of
"What are you staring at?

Will you stop staring at me."

Gailey then stated to Johnson words to the effect of, "She
keeps staring at me."

Johnson then looked directly at Plain-

tiff and stated words to the effect of, "She must think we
look like dead dogs."

Upon information and belief, later

that same evening, Gailey stated to Manager Susan Stedman,
words to the effect of, "Debi will be upset about what I said."
(R. 213).
34.

On or about December 30, 1984, Plaintiff wrote

and delivered to Defendant Bateson-Hough a written complaint,
in which Plaintiff set forth the incident described in the
preceding paragraph.
35.

(R. 214).

During January, 1985, Bateson-Hough called Plain-

tiff into her office and informed Plaintiff that Bateson-Hough
had forwarded Plaintiff's written complaint of December 30,
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1984, to the EEO Coordinator's Office, and had received from
the EEO Coordinator's Office in response thereto, a letter
which allegedly reprimanded Plaintiff for her repeated complaints concerning Gailey.

Bateson-Hough then stated to

Plaintiff that Plaintiff was on warning of dismissal as of
that date, said warning to become part of Plaintiff's permanent employment record, and that if Plaintiff continued
to complain about Gailey, Plaintiff would be terminated.
Bateson-Hough refused to allow Plaintiff to review the
alleged letter from the EEO Coordinator's Office, or to
allow Plaintiff to review her personnel record.
36.

(R. 214).

On the same day and immediately prior to Plain-

tiff's having been placed on warning of dismissal by BatesonHough during January of 1985, as referred to within the
preceding paragraph, Plaintiff observed Bateson-Hough and
Gailey conversing in a casual manner.

Upon noticing Plain-

tiff, Gailey made a smug facial expression towards Plaintiff.
(R. 215).
37.

Following Plaintiff's conversation with Bateson-

Hough, described in the preceding paragraph, Defendants and
other employees of the Wasatch Office, continued to harass and
intimidate Plaintiff by staring at and making hostile facial
expressions toward Plaintiff, by sitting and walking near
Plaintiff, and by talking about Plaintiff amongst themselves.
(R. 215).
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38.

On February 22, 1985, Plaintiff filed a civil

action in the United States District Court for the State of
Utah, Central Division, Civil No.

85-189W, which alleged

violations of Title VII and 42 USC Sec. 1983.

On June 11,

1985, said Complaint was dismissed by Order of the Court,
per the Honorable David K. Winder, due to Plaintiff's failure
to respond to AT&T's Motion to Dismiss filed April 9, 1985.
(R. 90-99).
39.

During approximately March, 1985, meetings were

held by various managers of the Wasatch Office with each of
the employees of the Wasatch Office, in groups of two or three
employees at a time, for the purpose of discussing the results
of the survey which had been taken by the EEO Coordinator's
Office during approximately November, 1984.

During Plain-

tiff's meeting with Manager Fayonne Johannason, Plaintiff
was informed by Johannason that the survey had concluded
that there was a great deal of discussion about sexual
matters at the Wasatch Office. Johannason further indicated
that employees of the Wasatch Office should bring incidents
of offensive behavior to the attention of management, rather
than allowing such incidents to remain unreported.
40.

(R. 215).

Following the issuance of the EEO Coordinator's

report on the results of the survey which was administered
during November of 1984, the incidents of offensive conduct
and communications increased in frequency and offensiveness.
(R. 216).
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41.

During approximately March, 1985, Appellant over-

heard a conversation wherein Defendant Johnson was speaking
loudly with another female employee.

During said conversa-

tion, Johnson stated to the other employee words to the
effect of, "I'm really horny, I'm going to go finger myself."

In response to this comment hy Johnson, the other

employee stated words to the effect of, "If you need any
help, I'll be right next door."
42.

(R. 216).

During approximately March of 1985, Plaintiff,

while working at her station, overheard several employees of
the Wasatch Office, including Johnson, discussing in detail
their past alleged sexual experiences, including homosexual
experiences, and including detailed descriptions of sexual
organs and various sexual activities.

Said discussion trans-

pired over a period of approximately 30 minutes.
43.

(R. 216).

During approximately April, 1985, Plaintiff,

acting in her capacity as Union Steward, received several
complaints from employees of the Wasatch Office, to the
effect that they had seen Johnson put her hand down the
blouse of another female employee during work hours.
(R. 216).
44.

During approximately May, 1985, Bateson-Hough

instituted a policy whereby some computers would be used
solely for handling slow calls, while other computers would
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handle only fast calls.

Operators handling the slow compu-

ters would inevitably have a lower productivity than other
operators.

According to r^teson-Hough*s expressed policy,

each operator should have spent equal time on the slow computers.

However, upon information and belief, Plaintiff

was required to spend far more than an equal share of time
on the slow computers, with a consequent drop in productivity rating. (R. 216-217).
45.

On or about June 16, 1985, Plaintiff saw Randall

approach Johnson from behind, put her arms around Johnson,
and kiss Johnson for a period of approximately 60 seconds.
Upon information and belief, Johnson was acting as supervisor
of the Wasatch Office at the time of this incident.

Later

that same evening, Plaintiff overheard an employee of the
Wasatch Office ask Johnson if she (i.e., the other employee)
could eat a brownie while 3he was working on the computer
board.

(Upon information and belief, eating or drinking

while working was contrary to AT&T policy).

In response to

said request, Johnson stated words to the effect of, "No,
because there are some people who will tell on me.
that right, Debi?"

Isn't

This statement was made while Johnson

was looking directly at Plaintiff.

Plaintiff suffered great

emotional distress as a result of this incident and was
required to leave work earLy.

(R. 217).
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46.

During approximately July, 1985, Plaintiff began

to make regular visits to Jerry S. Gardner, a psychoanalyst,
for the purpose of obtaining treatment for stress and anxiety
which Plaintiff was suffering as a result of the retaliation
and harassment to which she was being subjected at the
Wasatch Office.
47.

(R. 218).

On or about August 5, 1985, an employee of the

Wasatch Office brought a book to work entitled "Joy of Sex".
Said book was disseminated and discussed among various
employees of the Wasatch Office, including Johnson, for a
period of approximately one week.
48.

(R. 218).

On or about August 8, 1985, Bateson-Hough alter-

ed the seating arrangements of Wasatch Office employees,
with the result that Plaintiff would have to sit next to
persons who were participating in the harassment of Plaintiff.

(R. 218).
49.

On or about August 15, 1985, Plaintiff witnessed

two female employees of the Wasatch Office lightly rubbing
each other's arms while at work for a period of approximately
several minutes.
50.

(R. 218).

During approximately August, 1985, Plaintiff

obtained a prescription from her physician, Nelson E. Wright,
M.D., for Mellaril, for treatment of stress and anxiety that
Plaintiff was experiencing as a result of the harassment to
which she had been subj ected at the Wasatch Office. (R. 218)•
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51.

On or about August 22, 1985, Gailey moved to a

position directly in front of Plaintiff and stated to Plaintiff words to the effect of, "What are you looking for?"
(R. 219).
52.

On or about August 24, 1985, Defendants Johnson

and Randall moved to positions directly in front of Plaintiff.
While working at such positions, Randall put he^ arm around
Johnson and stated to Johnson words to the effect of, "It's
too bad we're being watched all the time."
53.

(R. 219).

On or about September 7, 1985, Plaintiff took

leave from work for medical disability, which disability
consisted of severe psychological stress and anxiety resulting from the harassment Plaintiff had experienced at the
Wasatch Office.

Said medical disability extended from

September 7, 1985, to the date of Plaintiff's termination
from AT&T on March 26, 1986.
54.

(R. 219).

During November of 1985, Plaintiff was advised

by her psychiatrist that Plaintiff would be permanently
unable to return to work with the persons who had been
harassing Plaintiff.
55.

(R. 219).

On or about March 12, 1986, Plaintiff received

a telephone call from Douglas Erickson, who was then Group
Manager of the Wasatch Office.

Defendant Randall was also

on the line throughout the ensuing conversation.

Erickson

informed Plaintiff during this conversation that inasmuch
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as Plaintiff would be medically incapable of continuing her
employment at the Wasatch Office, Plaintiff would be required
to transfer for work to Boise, Idaho, such transfer to be
effective within ten (10) days from the date thereof, in
order for Plaintiff to continue her employment with AT&T.
During this conversation, Plaintiff responded to Erickson's
statement by informing Erickson that it would be impossible
for Plaintiff to transfer upon such short notice inasmuch as
Plaintiff was then undergoing psychiatric treatment in Salt
Lake City for the injuries she had sustained through Defendants' harassment of Plaintiff and inasmuch as Plaintiff's
minor daughter was attending school in Salt Lake City, Utah.
In response to these statements by Plaintiff, Randall stated
words to the effect of, "What do you expect us to do, build
you a new building?"

Erickson responded to Plaintiff's

statements by informing Plaintiff that Plaintiff's failure
to report for work in Boise, Idaho, within ten days would
result in Plaintiff's termination from AT&T.
56.

(R. 219-220).

On or about March 28, 1986, Plaintiff received

a letter from Erickson dated March 26, 1986. In said letter,
Erickson informed Plaintiff that inasmuch as Plaintiff had
failed to report for work in Boise, Idaho, by March 23, 1986>
Plaintiff's employment with AT&T was terminated, effective
March 26, 1986.

(R. 220).
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57.

On July 21, 1988, Plaintiff commenced a civil

action against AT&T and the individuals named h€?rein as Defendants in the United States District Court for the District of
Utah, alleging numerous federal and state causes of action,
including the state claims which are alleged in the present
action.

On March 16, 1989, said action was dismissed by

Order of the Honorable David K. Winder, U.S. District Court
Judge, on the grounds that Plaintiff's federal claims were
barred by limitations.

Plaintiff's pendant state claims

were dismissed without prejudice.
58.

(R. 105-112).

On April 5, 1989, Plaintiff commenced the

present action by filing a Verified Complaint in the
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, Civil No. 890902183CV.

Said Verified Complaint

was dismissed by Order of the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
on December 6, 1989.

(R. 324-325).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I

The Utah State Supreme Court strongly implied in
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah, 1989),
that the Court would recognize a common-law cause of action
for wrongful termination in violation of a clear mandate of
public policy.

Such recognition would be in consonance with

the trend in a growing number of jurisdictions which have
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recognized such a cause of action, and is necessary to
insure that employers do not use their authority to subvert
subtantial public interests.
POINT II
Plaintiff denies that she had a remedy under the collective bargaining agreement for the conduct or injuries
which are alleged in this action.

Even if she had such a

remedy, there is no reason to deny a cause of action for
wrongful termination in violation of public policy to contractual employees.

The essential reason for recognizing

such claims is not merely to provide a remedy for otherwise
remediless employees but to protect substantial interests
of public policy.

Such interests apply equally to at-will

and contractual employees.

Withholding such a remedy from

contractual employees would have the anomalous effect of
providing greater protection to at-will employees than to
contractual employees, and could leave contractual employees
with remedies which are inadequate to vindicate their essential rights under state law.
POINT III
Federal Anti-Discrimination Statutes expressly do not
pre-empt state remedies which are consistent with the federal
statutes.

The Utah Anti-Discrimination Act (Utah Code Anno-

tated Sec. 34-35-1, et. seq.) expressly excludes retaliation
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from the types of discrimination which are pre-empted by the
Act.

Moreover, even if the UADA were silent or ambiguous on

the issue of whether a common-law action for retaliatory discharge is pre-empted by the Act, the Court should find that
such an action is not pre-empted.
POINT IV
Plaintiff's claims are not pre-empted by federal labor
law for the reason that they do not arise from or depend upon
an analysis of the collective bargaining agreement.

Plain-

tiff's claims arise wholly from non-negotiable rights under
state law, and are completely independent of any right
established by the collective bargaining agreement.
POINT V
Plaintiff was not required to exhaust her contractual
remedies within the collective bargaining agreement in this
case because her claims do not arise from or involve the
collective bargaining agreement.
POINT VI
Plaintiff's claims for negligent employment, breach of
contract, and intentional Lnfliction of emotional distress are
not barred by limitations because the acts complained of by
Plaintiff occurred within the applicable statute of limitations .
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POINT VII
Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
POINT VIII
Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a claim for malicious
interference with contract.

A R G U M E N T
POINT I

UTAH SHOULD RECOGNIZE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL
TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
Defendants argued within page 6 of their Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss, dated June 1, 1989, (hereinafter referred to as "Defendants' Memorandum") (R. 60), that Utah does not recognize a
cause of Action for wrongful termination in violation of public
policy.

However, in Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d

at 1042, Justice Durham stated:
Perhaps the most logical exception to the
at-will rule is based upon public policy.
Where an employee is discharged for a
reason or in a manner that contravenes
sound principles of established and substantial public policy, the employee may
typically bring a tort cause of action
against his employer.
In his concurring opinion in Berube, at page 1050,
Justice Zimmerman stated:
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As for the "public policy" exception, I
agree with the lead opinion that such an
exception to the at-will presumption should
be recognized in Utah, even though it is
not applicable in the present cases
Thus, it appears that a majority of the Utah Supreme
Court would recognize a cause of action for wrongful terrain1
ation in violation of public policy in an appropriate case.
In the present case, the policy which Plaintiff seeks
to vindicate through her wrongful termination action is the
policy which prohibits employers from retaliating against
employees for their rightful resistance to sexual harassment
and discrimination.

Such policy is established within the

state of Utah by the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act which prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who
reasonably oppose "any employment practice prohibited under
this chapter....", Utah Code Annotated Sec. 34-35-2(15).
Such prohibited employment practices include sexual harassment and discrimination.
6(1)(a)(i).

Utah Code Annotated Sec. 34-35-

Further, the Utah policy against employer

retaliation was established prior to the enactment of the

1
See also Larson v. Sysco Corp., 767 P.2d 557, 559 (Utah,
1989) (discussing the "public policy exception" under
Idaho law). A history and analysis of the cause of
action, and a list of the jurisdictions which recognize
such actions is provided in Phipps v. Clark Oil, 396
NW 2d. 588 (Minn. App., 1986).
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UADD by two sections of the Utah Labor Code (UCA Sections
34-1-8(1)(f) and 34-4-12), of which the UADD subsequently
became a part.

Finally, the state policy against employer

retaliation is manifest by the anti-retaliation provision of
42 USC Sec. 2000e-3.

Federal law may serve as an indication

or basis of state public policy.

Adler v. American Standard

Corp., 538 F.Supp. 572 (D. Md. 1982); Johnson v. World Color
Press, Inc., 498 NE 2d 575 (111. App. 1986).

Several courts

have recognized a cause of action for wrongful termination in
violation of public policy in situations similar to the present
2
case.
The policy asserted by Plaintiff in this case is one
of broad public importance and is well established within the
State of Utah and throughout the United States.
POINT II
A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION
IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY SHOULD BE
ALLOWED FOR CONTRACTUAL EMPLOYEES AS
WELL AS FOR AT-WILL EMPLOYEES
Defendants assert within pages 6-7 of their Memorandum
(R. 60-61), and pages 7-11 of Defendants' Reply Memorandum in
2
Holien v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 689 P.2d 1292 (Ore. 1984);
Rojo v. Kliger, 257 Cal. Rptr. 158 (Cal. App. 1989); Savage
v. Holiday Inn, 603 F.Supp. 311 (D. Nev. 1985); Leong
v. Hilton Hotels, 689 F.Supp 1565 (D. Haw. 1988); Clay
v. Advanced Computer,, 536 A.2d 1375 (Pa. Super. 1988);
Ericks on v. Marsh & McLellan, 545 A.2d 812 (N.J. Super.
1988); Merrell v. All Seasons Resorts, 720 F. Supp. 815
(D. Cal. 1989); Froyd v. Cook, 681 F. Supp. 669 (D. Cal.
1988); Avant v. Natl. Bank, 265 NW 2d 410 (Mich. App. 1978).
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support of their Motion to Dismiss, dated August 14, 1989,
(hereinafter referred to as "Defendants1 Reply Memorandum")
(R. 275-279), that Utah should not recognize a cause of action
for wrongful termination in violation of public policy for
employees who are covered by an employment contract, and who,
therefore, have a contractual remedy for wrongful termination.
In support of their assertion, Defendants make two arguments:
(1)

That recognition of a policy-based action on behalf of

contractual employees would interfere with the state policy
which favors private resolution of labor disputes (R. 276278), and (2)

That the purpose of the policy-based action

for wrongful termination is merely to provide a remedy for
otherwise remediless at-will employees, so that there is no
justification for the allowance of such a claim where an
employee has a contractual remedy.

(R. 275-276).

Plaintiff denies that she had a remedy under the collective bargaining agreement in this case.

Although the

collective bargaining agreement contains a prohibition
against sex discrimination (R. 156), it contains no prohibition against retaliation for filing a charge or complaint.
The collective bargaining Agreement contains a clause requiring cause for termination (R. 65), but that clause was
ineffectual in this case, where the cause of Plaintiff's
injuries was not her formal termination but Defendants'
tortious conduct which prevented Plaintiff from continuing
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her employment at the Wasatch Office.

In the circumstances

of this case, Plaintiff's termination was simply a consequence or effect of Defendants' prior tortious conduct.
The collective bargaining agreement contains no provision
or remedy for these circumstances.
The present case is similar to the situation which
existed in Petermann v. International Brotherhood, etc.,
344 P.2d 25 (Cal. App., 1959), wherein the court recognized a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation
of public policy even though the plaintiff was a union
member, because the collective bargaining agreement did
not provide a remedy for the particular in.iury which had
been incurred by the plaintiff.

In so holding, the court

stated:
Since it does not appear in the complaint
that plaintiff was ever "accused" of anything and disciplinary action thereafter
taken, he has no right to appeal under
article XVIII, section 2(a).
In the present case, as in Petermann. Plaintiff was
not "disciplined".

She was constructively discharged by

being harassed into a medical disability.

These circum-

stances were not contemplated by the collective bargaining
agreement and could not be effectively remedied through the
grievance process.
Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff did have a remedy
under the collective bargaining agreement, that fact should
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not prevent Plaintiff from bringing an action for wrongful
termination based upon public policy.

Regarding Defen-

dants* first argument against allowing such an action for
contractual employees —

that it would interfere with the

state policy favoring private resolution of labor disputes

—

this argument is essentially the same as Defendants1 Sec.
301 pre-emption argument under Point IV, infra.

The state

policy favoring private resolution of labor disputes is
the same policy which is furthered and protected by the
pre-emptive effect of Sec. 301 of the Labor-Management
Relations Act (LMRA).

Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,

471 U.S. 202, 210-212 (1985).

Defendants have not argued

that the Utah policy is broader than the federal policy
established by Sec. 301.

To the contrary, the one Utah case

cited by Defendants on this issue, Lindon City v. Engineers
Const. Co., 636 P.2d 1070 (Utah, 1981), (R. 277), in turn
cites the case of Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960), which is a Section 301 case.

Moreover, of

the cases from other Jurisdictions which are cited by Defendants on this point, Durrette v. UGI Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1139
(D. Pa. 1987) (R. 278), is a Section 301 case, and Lamb v.
Briggs Manufacturing, 700 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1983), and
Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 407 NE 2d 97 (111. App.
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1980) (R.277), each rely upon Steelworkers in defining the
3
parameters of state policy.
Even if the Utah policy favoring private resolution
of labor contract disputes is broader than the federal policy,
which Defendants have not alleged, surely that does not mean
that all civil actions arising in an employment context are
pre-empted wherever there is a collective bargaining agreement.

As with federal labor policy, only claims which rely

upon or involve a substantial analysis of the collective bargaining agreement must be pre-empted in order to preserve
the state policy.

Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S., at 221.

Plain-

tiff's claims in the present case do not arise from or require
an analysis or interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement.

They arise from independent and non-negotiable

rights established by state law, and are not pre-empted.
See Point IV, infra.
Concerning Defendants' second argument that there is
no need to recognize a cause of action based upon public

3
The case of Herring v. Prince Foods, 611 F.Supp.
(D. N.J. 1985), which was cited by Defendants on
point within page 7 of their Memorandum (R. 61),
reversed on appeal. Herring v. Prince Macaroni,
F.2d 120 (3rd Cir. 1986).
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this
was
711

policy for employees who have a cause of action for breach
of contract, Plaintiff recognizes that numerous cases have
described the public policy-based action for wrongful termination as an exception to the at-will employment rule.
But the fact that public policy may provide an exception to
at-will employment is no reason to deny the remedy to contractual employees.

The primary reason for the policy-

based cause of action is the concern that employers may
discipline or terminate their employees for reasons which
contravene the public welfare, not merely the fact that
at-will employees are otherwise without a remedy.

Phipps,

396 NW 2d. at 593-594; Ewing v. Koppers Co., 537 A.2d 1173,
1174-1175 (Md. App. 1988).

In most of the cases in which

the courts have discussed the public policy exception to
at-will employment, there has simply been no reason for the
courts to consider whether the public policy-based action
should be available to contractual employees.

Of the cases

in which the courts have had occasion to consider that
4
issue, the vast majority have allowed the cause of action.

4
Peabody Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309, 1323-1324 (10th Cir.
1981); Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 473 NE 2d 1280, 12831284 (111. 1984); Lepore v. National Tool & Mfg. Co., 540
A.2d 1296, 1300-1301 (N.J. Super. 1988); Johnson v. Transworld Airlines, Inc., 196 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899 (Cal. App.
1983); Ewing v. Koppers Co., 537 A. 2d at 1174-1175.
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The authorities cited by Defendants on this issue are
not compelling.

In Lamb v. Briggs Manufacturing Co., 700 F.2d

at 1096, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals applied what it
clearly considered to be a questionable rule of Illinois law:
While we might find that such disparities
between the fruits of successful pursuit of
tort and contractual remedies warranted the
creation of an unqualified right of action
for retaliatory discharge, were we given
jurisdiction to determine the issue as a
matter of federal judicial policy, we decline
to so interpret Illinois law when faced with
the carefully hedged formulations and
rationales put forth by the state's
highest court.... (citations deleted).
Further, Lamb and Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.
were directly superseded by Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc.,
473 NE. 2d at 1284 (111. 1984).
Recognition of a public policy-based claim for wrongful
termination only for at-will employees would have the anomalous
effect of providing greater remedies for at-will employees than
for contractual employees, whose remedies are limited to those
specified in the contract.

Midgett

at 1284.

Further, the

public welfare should not be dependent upon the effectiveness
of contractual procedures and remedies, which may be inadequate to protect rights which are established by state law.
Lepore v. National Tool and Manufacturing Co., 540 A. 2d at
1301.

The public policy against employer retaliation which

is asserted by Plaintiff in the present case extends equally
to union and non-union employees, and should be protected to
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the same extent.

Utah Code Annotated Sec. 34-35-2(15); 42

U.S.C. Seco 2000e-3.

Moreover, contractual remedies may be

inadequate where the employer's conduct rises to the level
of a tort.

Lepore at 1301.

The distinction urged by Defendants would create practical problems in enforcement.

Under current Utah law, as in

most jurisdictions, the existence of an implied employment
contract is a fact-intensive issue, which may be highly unpredictable in the circumstances of particular cases.
at 1044.

Berube

Employees should not be required to accurately

predict whether thev have a contractual remedy before bringing an action for vindication of their public rights under
state law.
In Berube, 771 P.2d, at 1043-1044, note 10, Justice
Durham stated:
A cause of action for dismissal in violation
of public policy must lie for both at-will
employees and employees for a specified
term. It would make little sense for atwill employees to enjoy the protection of
substantial public policies while employees
for term were denied them.
Thus, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the lack
of a contractual remedy should not be a prerequisite to the
statement of a claim for wrongful termination in violation
of public policy.

Plaintiff submits that this rule is in

accordance with the better-reasoned decisions of other
jurisdictions, which have recognized a tort action that is
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independent from any contractual remedy that might exist•
K-Mart Corp. v. Posnock, 732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987); Dare
v. Montana Petroleum, 687 P.2d 1015 (Mont, 1984); Pompey
v. General Motors Corp., 180 NW 2d 243 (Mich. 1971).
POINT III
PLAINTIFFS CLAIMS FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION AND
NEGLIGENT EMPLOYMENT ARE NOT PRE-EMPTED BY
FEDERAL AND STATE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS
Defendants asserted within pages 7-11 of their Memorandum and page 6, note 4 of their Reply Memorandum (R. 6165, 274), that Plaintiff's actions for wrongful termination
and negligent employment are pre-empted by Federal AntiDiscrimination Statutes.

However, Title VII expressly

pre-empts only those state laws which are inconsistent with
Title VII.

42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-7.

The nonpre-emptive

effect of Title VII extends not only to overlapping statutory remedies for employment discrimination, as contended by
Defendants at R. 274, but also to state common-law remedies
which are not inconsistent with Title VII.

Savage v. Holiday

Inn Corp., 603 F. Supp. at 315; Leong v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,
689 F. Supp. at 1567-1568; Clay v. Advanced Computer, 536 A.2d
at 1381.

Defendants have cited no authority to the contrary.

Defendants also assert within pages 7-11 of their
Memorandum, and pages 2-7 and 11-13 of their Reply Memorandum
(R. 61-65: 270-275: and 279-281), that Plaintiff's claims for
wrongful termination and negligent employment are pre-empted
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by the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, Utah Code Annotated
Sec. 34-35-1f etc seq.

However, the exclusive remedy pro-

vision of the UADA specifically exempts retaliation from the
types of discrimination for which the Act provides the exclusive remedy.

Utah Code Annotated Sec. 34-35-7.1(15) states:
The procedures contained in this section
and Sec. 34-35-8 are the exclusive remedy
under state law for employment discrimination because of race, color, sex, age,
religion, national origin, or handicap.
(Emphasis added).

The statute specifically identifies the types of discrimination for which it provides the exclusive remedy, and
excludes retaliation from that list.

Defendants interpret

the statute as though there were a period after the word
"discrimination" (R. 279), thereby rendering the remainder
of the sentence superfluous, contrary to established rules
of statutory construction.

Rojo, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 163.

The exclusion of retaliatory discrimination from the
UADA's exclusive remedy provision was not a legislative oversight.

The Utah Legislature was well aware of the existence

of retaliatory discrimination at the time it enacted the UADA.
Utah Code Annotated Sec. 34-35-6(1)(a)(i) specifically refers
to retaliation as a form of discrimination.

Utah Code Anno-

tated Sec. 34-35-2(15) provides a detailed definition of the
word "retaliate" in language which is very similar to the antiretaliation provision of Title VII (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-3).
The "Charge of Discrimination" forms which are utilized by
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the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division list "retaliation" as a
form of discrimination which is co-equal to the other forms of
discrimination that are prohibited under the UADA. (R-88, 103).
The legislative intent to exclude retaliation from the
UADA's exclusive remedy provision is further indicated by the
fact that Utah has established multiple remedies for employer
5
retaliation.
For example, an act of retaliation which is in
violation of the UADA may also, in particular circumstances,
constitute a violation of the Utah Constitutional prohibition
6
against blacklisting.
In order to avoid a conflict between
the UADA and other state statutory prohibitions against
employer retaliation, the legislature intentionally excluded
retaliation from the UADA's exclusive remedy provision.
The distinction between retaliation and other forms
of employment discrimination within the UADA's exclusive
remedy provision is due to the qualitative distinction between
retaliation and other forms of discrimination.

Retaliation

occurs due to an employee's exercise of her legal rights,

5
Const. Utah, Art. XII, Sec. 19 (Blacklisting); Utah Code
Annotated Sec. 34-35-6(1)(a),(e) (Anti-Discrimination);
Utah Code Annotated Sections 67-21-1, et. seq. (Whistle
Blowers' Protection); Utah Code Annotated Sec. 34-28-19
(Wage Claims); Utah Code Annotated Sec. 34-22-12 (Wage-AndHour Disputes).
6
Such a fact situation was presented in Rutherford v.
American Bank of Commerce. 565 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir., 1977).

- 37 -

whereas other forms of discrimination are based upon an
employee's status. Other courts have found this distinction
to be significant.

In Holien v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 689

P. 2d at 1300, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's claim for wrongful discharge was not pre-empted by the
existence of an administrative remedy established by statute:
[I]t is not the supervisor's demand, or
discriminatory sexual harassment, for
which plaintiff seeks common-law tort
damages; it is for a tortious discharge
following her rightful resistance to
those demands or harassment.
In his concurring opinion in Holien, Justice Linde
stated:
If plaintiff's tort claim were one for
"discriminatory discharge," that i3 to
say, if her claim were that she was discharged by reason of her sex, there would
be serious doubt that the remedies for
employment discrimination enacted by the
legislature leave room for an action for
damages or that the common law would
recognize it. But this plaintiff's
case does not hinge on showing that
her employer, Sears Roebuck & Co., discharged her by reason of-her sex. Her
case depends on showing that Sears
discharged her for exercising a legal
right to resist a supervisor's sexual
advances, which is a very different
thing.
Similarly, in

Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448

F.Supp. 910, 917 (D. Mich., 1977), (cited in Defendants'
Reply Memorandum at R. 272), the court found the distinction between retaliation and status discrimination to be
significant:
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[Plaintiff] does not claim that she was
fired because of any affirmative act on
her part taken in an effort to claim a
legal entitlement or for her refusal to
perform an act from which she would be
protected by public policy. Instead
she claims that she was fired because
of her age and/or sex. While it would
be against public policy if either of
these reasons were the basis for her
termination, statutory remedies have
been provided to protect employees from
discharge on the basis of sex or age,
and it is not necessary to expand the
public policy exception to provide protection for employees for discharges
based on status rather than affirmative
conduct.
In the present case, Plaintiff has clearly alleged
retaliation as opposed to sex discrimination.

Admittedly,

the distinction between retaliation and sex discrimination
is not always clear, and may depend upon the defendant's
motive rather than upon the content of his acts or communications.

However, in the present case, Plaintiff alleges

numerous acts which were purely retaliatory in nature, as
well as several incidents which, while sexually-oriented,
were intended merely to retaliate.

(R. 209-219).

In support of their UADA pre-emption argument, Defendants cite numerous cases from other jurisdictions, all of
which are distinguishable from the present case on the grounds
that the statutory remedies for employment discrimination in
those cases contained no express exclusivity provision, or

- 39 -

contained exclusivity provisions which are very different
7
from that of the UADA.
Where the statute at issue contains

Trembath v. St. Regis Paper Co,, 753 F.2d 603 (7th Cir.
1985); Bruffet v. Warner Communications, Inc., 692 F.2d
910 (3rd Cir. 1982); Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp.,
448 F.Supp. 910 (D. Mich. 1977); Wehr v. Burroughs Corp.,
438 F.Supp. 1052 (D. Pa., 1977); Pierce v. New Process
Co., 580 F. Supp. 1343 (D. Pa. 1984); McCluney v. Jos.
Schlitz Brewing Co., 489 F. Supp. 24 (D. Wise. 1980);
Greene v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 623 F. Supp. 295
(D. Me. 1985); Crews v. Memorex Corp., 588 F. Supp. 27
(D. Mass. 1984); Mahoney v. Crocker Natl. Bank, 571 F.
Supp. 287 (D. Cal. 1983) (erroneously cited in Defendants' Reply Memorandum as "571 F.2d 287") (R. 268, 272).
The support for Defendants' position is actually not as
strong as their 9-case list of citations implies. All
of the cases cited by Defendants involve federal courts
purporting to apply state law. Three of the cases cited
by Defendants, Bruffet, Pierce, and Wehr, are Pennsylvania
cases decided under that state's peculiar statutory provision which specifically requires exhaustion of the
administrative remedy once that remedy is invoked, but
allows plaintiffs to proceed directly to court if they
choose to forego the administrative remedy. Wehr at
1055-1056. In California, Mahoney has been superseded
by Rojo v. Kliger, Froyd v. Cook, and Merrell v. All
Seasons Resorts (See footnote 2, supra). Schroeder does
not represent the current state of Michigan law. See
Holmes v. Haughton Elevator Co., 272 NW 2d. 550 (Mich.
1978). Crews does not fully reflect Massachusetts law.
See Treadwell v. John Hancock Inc., 666 F. Supp. 279
(D. Mass. 1987). Greene was reversed on appeal. See
Greene v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 764 F.2d 19 (1st Cir.
1985), and was based upon the fact that Maine has not yet
adopted the "public policy exception". See Pooler v. Maine
Coal Products, 532 A.2d 1026 (Me. 1987). Trembath and
McCluney are Wisconsin cases which follow that state's
very narrow application of the public policy exception.
See Brockmeyer v. Dunn & Bradstreet, 335 NW 2d. 834
(Wis. 1983) (adopting minority position). Of the cases
cited by Defendants, only McCluney involved a retaliation
claim.
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an express exclusive remedy provision, the statutory language
obviously controls.

Lally v. Copygraphics, 413 A,2d 960, 965

(N.J. App. 1980).
Nevertheless, Plaintiff recognizes that this Court
could possibly determine that the UADA is silent or ambiguous
with respect to whether it pre-empts a common-law action for
retaliatory termination.

In that event, Plaintiff submits

that the Court should rule in accordance with general principles of statutory construction and in furtherance of the Utah
policy against employment retaliation that Plaintiff's wrongful
termination claim is not pre-empted.
The issue of whether state statutory remedies for
employment discrimination which contain no express exclusivity
provision pre-empt common-law remedies for discrimination has
been frequently litigated in recent times, with widely dis8
parate results among the jurisdictions.

8
Cases which have decided that common-law remedies are not
pre-empted include those which are cited at note 2, supra.
See also Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing, 543 NE 2d.
1212 (Ohio 1989); Brewster v. Martin-Marieta Aluminum Sales,
378 NW 2d. 555 (Mich. App. 1985). The authorities which
Defendants allege support the proposition that a statutory
anti-discrimination remedy pre-empts an action for retaliatory discharge are identified in note 7, supra.

- 41 -

The cases in which a common-law remedy has been held
to be pre-empted generally identify one or more of five reasons
for reaching that conclusion, all of which were raised within
Defendants' memoranda.

Those reasons are:

(1)

The general

principle that a statutory remedy is presumed to be exclusive
in the absence of express language to the contrary; (2) Allowance of a common-law action would circumvent the procedures of
a statutory remedy; (3) Allowance of a common-law action would
upset the legislative balancing of the interests of employers
and employees; (4) Allowance of a common-law action could
result in duplicative administrative and judicial proceedings;
and (5) Allowance of a common-law action is unnecessary where
employees have a statutory remedy.
While these arguments have convinced some jurisdictions that statutory remedies should be exclusive even in the
absence of express exclusionary language in the? statute (cases
cited note 7 ) , they have been rejected by the courts which have
held that common-law remedies are not pre-empte^d (cases cited
note 8 ) . Plaintiff submits that the arguments advanced in
favor of exclusion are largely illusory and that sound principles of statutory construction and public policy favor the
allowance of a common-law action for wrongful termination in
violation of public policy where such actions are not expressly
precluded by statute.
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In regard to the argument that statutory remedies are
generally exclusive (Schroeder, 448 F. Supp. at 914), Plaintiff submits that there is no such presumption in the area of
civil rights legislation, where statutory remedies are construed as being supplemental in order to achieve their remedial
purposes.

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 4836,

4847-48 (1974); Pompey v. General Motors Corp., 180 NW 2d.
243, 251 (Mich. 1971).

In enacting civil rights legislation,

the legislature usually intends to broaden, rather than restrict, the availability of remedies.

Consequently, civil

rights statutes should be construed as non-exclusive in the
absence of express statutory language to the contrary•
Further, the rule of statutory exclusivity applies
only to rights which are first created by the statute.
Common-law rights which pre-exist the statutory remedy are
not pre-empted in the absence of express pre-emptory language
in the statute.

Even the cases which have found in favor of
9
pre-emption have recognized this rule.
In Mahoney and Schroeder, the courts distinguished the
plaintiffs1 common-law actions for age discrimination from

9
Mahoney v. Crocker Natl.Bank, 571 F. Supp. at 293-294;
Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F. Supp. at 914.
Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing, 543 NE 2d., at
1216; Holien v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 689 P.2d at 1303;
Rojo v. Kliger. 257 Cal. Reptr. at 163.
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prior state court decisions which allowed wrongful termination
actions based upon race discrimination.
571, 293-294, stated:

The Court in Mahoney,

"Plaintiffs have cited the court to no

case or statute, prior to the F.S. at CFEHA, which recognized
a right to be protected from age discrimination,."
in Schroeder, 448 F. Supp. at 914, stated:

The Court

"Prior to [the

creation of the Civil Rights Commission] there was no constitutional prohibition against age or sex discrimination."
Thus, both Mahoney and Schroeder implied that a common-law
action for age discrimination would have been available if the
state policy against age discrimination had been manifest by
some statute or case decision prior to the enactment of the
anti-discrimination statute.
Several California courts have held that common-law
claims for sex discrimination in employment are not preempted by the state's Fair Employment Act, for the reason
that the California Constitution provided a right to be free
from such discrimination prior to the enactment of the Fair
Employment Act.

Rojo, 257 Cal. Rptr., at 166; Merrell, 720

F. Supp. at 819; Froyd, 681 F. Supp., at 676.

In Froyd, at

675-676, the court further held that the California policy
against employer retaliation pre-existed the Fair Employment
Act.

See also Rojo at 165.
The Utah policy against sex discrimination in employ-

ment existed prior to the enactment of the UADA.
Constitution of Utah, Article IV, Sec. 1 states:

-

A A

—

The

The rights of citizens of the State of Utah
to vote and hold office shall not be denied
or abridged on account of sex. Both male
and female citizens of this State shall
enjoy equally all civil, political, and
religious rights and privileges.
This Constitutional provision was identified as the
basis for the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act's prohibition
against sex discrimination in private employment in Beehive
Medical Electronicst Inc., v. Industrial Commission, 583 P.2d
53, 60 (Utah 1978).

Since sex discrimination was prohibited

in Utah prior to enactment of the UADA, employer retaliation
for an employee's opposition to such conduct was contrary to
state policy.

Rojo, 257 Cal. Rptr., at 165.

Further, the

original 1953 Utah Labor Code stated:
It shall be an unfair labor practice...
to discharge or otherwise discriminate
against an employee because he has filed
charges or given testimony under this act.
Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 34-1-8(1)(f).

Further, Utah Code

Annotated Sec. 34-4-12 of the original Labor Code stated:
An employer who discharges, or threatens to
discharge, or in any other manner discriminates against any employee because such
employee has testified or is about to testify,
or because such employer believes that said
employee may testify in any investigation or
proceedings relative to the enforcement of
this act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor .
These provisions predated the UADA and were repealed by the
1969 amendment to the Labor Code which first enacted the UADA.
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Thus, the Utah policy against sexual and retaliatory discrimination existed prior to the enactment of the UADA*
There is nothing in the language or legislative history
of the UADA which indicates that the Act was intended to supplant existing common-law remedies.

To the contrary, in dis-

cussing the UADA, the Utah Legislature repeatedly emphasized
that the Act was not intended to modify existing law within
the State of Utah.
In addition, Title VII of the United States Code prohibited sex discrimination and retaliation prior to the
enactment of the UADA.

Federal law may serve as a basis for

indicating state public policy.

Adler., 538 F. Supp. 572;

Johnson, 498 NE 2d 575.
Another exception to the general principle of statutory
exclusivity exists where the remedy which is created by
statute is inadequate to compensate for the injuries which
have been sustained by the plaintiff.

This has been a pri-

mary concern in the cases which have rejected the statutory

10
"This law makes no pretense to make any changes. In fact,
it leaves the law exactly the way it is." Speech of
Senator Buckner, proponent of Senate Bill No. 30,
February 7, 1969.
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exclusivity argument.

Holien, 689 P.2d at 1303-1304; Rojo,

257 Cal. Rptr. at 166; Brewster, 378 NW 2d at 568-569.

The

UADA, like Title VII, and most state anti-discrimination
statutes, provides only for equitable remedies, such as back
pay and reinstatement.

Beehive Medical Electronics, Inc., v.
11
Industrial Commission, 583 P.2d, at 59.
Such remedies may

be inadequate where an employee has suffered some personal
injury, such as severe emotional distress or injury to reputation through the employer's tortious conduct.

Wiggins v.

Eastern Ass. Coal Corp., 357 SE 2d 745, 748 (W. Va., 1987).
The loss of future income and benefits and compensatory
damages which may be necessary to make the plaintiff whole
are unavailable under the UADA, as are punitive damages which
should be available in extreme cases.

Peru Daily Tribune v.

Shuler, 544 NE 2d 560, 562 (Ind. App., 1989).

Given the reme-

dial nature of the UADA and civil rights legislation in general,
the UADA should not be construed as restricting an employee's
access to adequate compensation for tortious misconduct.

In

fact, such a construction might place the UADA in violation

11
In fact, the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division does not
have authority to enforce any remedy at all. Utah Code
Annotated Sec. 34-35-5. Actual enforcement of the UADA's
prohibitions against employment discrimination is left to
the District Courts. Utah Code Annotated Sec. 34-35-8.
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of the "open courts" provision of the Utah Constitution,
12
Article I, Section 11.
In Drinkwalter v. Shipton Supply Company, 732 P.2d
1335 (Monte 1987), the Montana Supreme Court held that
common-law actions were not pre-empted by a statutory remedy
for employment discrimination.

The Montana court's primary

concern was that if the statute provided the exclusive remedy:
The courthouse would be closed to individuals
against whom a tort had been committed, thus
contravening our constitutional right of access
to the court.... Our citizens' right to a trial
by jury...would be abridged as well.
Additionally, the Utah Administrative Procedures Act,
Utah Code Annotated Sec. 63-46b-14(1)(b)(i) provides that a
party is relieved from the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies if such remedies are inadequate.

The UADA

is subject to the provisions of the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act.

Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 34-35-7.1(10).

Inasmuch as the UADA provides no remedy for Plaintiff's

12
See Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348
(Utah, 1989), wherein the Court held that the limitation
upon damages for personal injuries caused by governmental
entities was invalid under Article I, Sec. 11 of the Utah
Constitution.
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very real prospective and compensatory damages, the remedies
provided by the UADA are inadequate in this case.
The second argument which has been raised in support of
statutory pre-emption is that allowance of independent commonlaw actions would circumvent the administrative remedy
provided by statute. (Bruffett 692 F.2d at 919). This argument is a tautology.

Nothing is "circumvented" if the

statutory remedy is cumulative rather than exclusive.
An employee may simply choose to forego the administrative
remedy.
The third argument which is raised in support of preemption, that recognition of a common-law action would upset
the legislature's "delicate balance" of the interests of
employers and employees (Greene, 623 F. Supp. at 299; Crews•
588 F. Supp. at 29), presupposes that such a balancing process
took place.

The two courts which cited this argument merely

assumed that the statutory remedy was intended to balance the
interests of employers and employees.
There is nothing in the language or legislative history
of the UADA which indicates that the Utah Legislature intended
to balance the interests of employers and employees in enacting the UADA.

The primary purpose of the UADA is to provide

a remedy for certain forms of employment discrimination.
Beehive Medical Electronics, 583 P.2d at 60.

Employers have

no legitimate interest in commiting unlawful discrimination*
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Parker v. Baltimore, 652 F.2d 1012, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Allowing a common-law action would further, not frustrate,
the legislature's objective*

Helmick, 543 NE 2d* at 1216;

Phipps, 396 NW 2d- at 593-594.
Plaintiff wishes to emphasize that Title VII of the
United States Code, which provides the most comprehensive
legislative procedures against employment discrimination to
date, has been uniformly held to not pre-empt state commonlaw remedies.

Leong, 689 F. Supp. at 1567-1568; Savage, 603

F. Supp. at 315; Clay, 536 A.2d at 1381.
The fourth argument in favor of pre-emption, that
concurrent administrative and judicial remedies could lead
to duplicative proceedings and inconsistent remedies (Crews
588 F. Supp. at 29), disregards the fact that the administrative remedy provided by the UADA and similar statutes
contains no mechanism or authority for enforcement.

UADD

determinations are merely intended to facilitate negotiation
and compromise.
the courts.

Actual enforcement of the Act is left to

UCA Sec. 34-35-8.

Any inconsistency between

concurrent proceedings would be rectified by principles of
collateral estoppel.
The fifth argument which has been raised in favor of
pre-emption is that common-law remedies are not necessary
where a statutory remedy has been provided. (McCluney, 489 F.
Supp. at 26-27; Wehr, 438 F. Supp at 1054).

The cases that

have raised this point are older cases which haive relied upon
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the assumption that the "public policy exception" is available
only to at-will employees.

However, as previously argued

within Point II hereof, the central inquiry should be upon
the importance of the asserted policy, and not upon whether
the employee had some arguably effective alternative remedy.
The courts which have allowed common-law actions for
employment discrimination in addition to statutory administrative remedies are sensitive to the pervasiveness, subtlety,
and injurious nature of employment discrimination in modern
society, and to the limited effectiveness of administrative
remedies.

In order to fully vindicate the state policy

against employment retaliation, this Court should recognize a
cause of action where it has not been excluded by the statute.
Plaintiff's cause of action for negligent employment
(R. 10-11), is not pre-empted for the additional reason that
it does not allege "discrimination" within the meaning of the
UADA's exclusive remedy provision.

Numerous courts, includ-

ing some of those which have held that an action for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy is pre-empted by
state anti-discrimination statutes, have held that common-law
tort claims which allege elements distinct from the elements
13
of employment discrimination, are not pre-empted•
13
Helmick, 543 NE 2d. 1212 (assault, defamation, invasion
of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
tortious interference and breach of contract); Schroedert
448 F. Supp. at 917-919 (intentional infliction of
emotional distress; Pierce, 580 F. Supp. at 1546
(intentional infliction of emotional distress); Greene,
623 F. Supp. at 299-300 (breach of contract).
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In fact, a contrary rule would lead to the untenable result
that such distinctive tort claims as assault, defamation, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress are pre-empted by
the statutory administrative remedies for employment discrimination •

Utah has long recognized a cause of action for

negligent employment which has distinctive elements.

Birkner

v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1059 (Utah 1989).
In Davis v. Utah Power & Light Co.,

Civ. No. 87-C-0659G

(D. Utah 1988) (Unpublished Memorandum Decision), the United
States Court for the District of Utah, per the Honorable J.
Thomas Greene, held that Davis' claim for negligent employment
was not pre-empted by the UADA.

In so holding, the Court

stated:
Because failure to supervise may encompass
more than acts defined to be "discriminatory
or prohibited employment practices" under the
Utah Act, the court concludes that the Act
does not pre-empt this cause of action.
Davis at 21-22.
The essence of Judge Greene's analysis was as follows:
This court reads the exclusive remedy provision
of the Act as only foreclosing those common-law
causes of action which are based upon the very
conduct which is necessary to prove sexual
harassment or sex discrimination under the Act,
namely, conduct expressly prohibited by the Act
or conduct satisfying all the essential elements
of a prima facie case. Where the allegation in
plaintiff's complaint demonstrates that plaintiff
has suffered a different injury than the Act
covers, an independent cause of action exists
outside the Act. Davis at 12-13.
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In the present case, Plaintiff's allegations of negligent employment go far beyond the essential elements of a
prima facie case of retaliatory discrimination.

Defendants'

harassment of Plaintiff continued and even increased following Plaintiff's complaints to her manager, to AT&T's EEO
Office, to the EEOC, and even the filing of a Title VII
complaint in federal court.

(R. 90-96, 210-220).

Further,

AT&T's own survey found a prevalence of sexually oriented
communications at the Wasatch Office, and advised employees
to report such conduct to AT&T management. (R. 215). These
facts are sufficient to state a claim for negligent employment.

Carr v. U.S. West Direct, 779 P.2d 154, 157 (Ore. App.

1989); Kreske v. Rulli, 432 NW 2d 764, 769 (Minn. App. 1988);
Cox v. Brazo, 303 SE 2d 71, 73 (Ga. App. 1983), aff'd 307 SE
2d 474 (1983).
For the same reasons, Judge Greene determined that
Davis' cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress was not pre-empted by the UADA.

Davis, at 17-18.

In the present case, Defendants have not even alleged that
Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional
14
distress is pre-empted.
14
Plaintiff's claim for wrongful termination in violation
of public policy differs significantly from the UADA's
prohibition against retaliatory discrimination in that
the burden of proof and potential damages are different.
Helmick, 543 NE 2d at 1216. Moreover, the degree of
employer culpability necessary to establish the tort
violation may be greater than that required for a violation of the UADA.
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POINT IV
PLAINTIFFS CLAIMS ARE NOT
PRE-EMPTED BY FEDERAL LABOR LAW
Defendants argue within pages 11-18 of their Memorandum, and pages 13-17 of their Reply Memorandum (R. 65-71,
281-285), that all of Plaintiffs claims are pre-empted by
Section 301 of the LMRA.
Section 301 has been construed by the federal courts
as manifesting a Congressional intent that federal law provide a uniform basis for the interpretation and application
of collective bargaining agreements.
v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209 (1980).

Allis-Chalmers Corp.,
Accordingly, state laws

which conflict or interfere with the federal regulation of
labor contract disputes are pre-empted by Section 301. Id.
However, Section 301 does not pre-empt all state regulations
which touch or concern the inter-relationship between employers, employees, and unions.

Allis-Chalmers, at 208, note 4.

Only claims which are "inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract" are pre-empted
Allis-Chalmers, at 216.

The central question in each case

is whether the state claim concerns some issue about which
the parties were free to bargain, or whether it derives from
some non-negotiable right under state law.

Id.

The United States Supreme Court recently expounded
upon Allis-Chalmers in a context similar to the present case.
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In Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 108 S.Ct. 1877
(1988), the plaintiff filed a common-law action for retaliatory discharge in an Illinois state court, alleging that she
had been terminated for filing a worker's compensation claim.
The plaintiff simultaneously pursued an arbitration remedy
within the collective bargaining agreement.

The employer

removed the state court action to federal court and moved for
dismissal on the grounds that plaintiff's common-law action
was pre-empted by Sec. 301 of the LMRA.

The Court of Appeals

for the 7th Circuit upheld the District Court's dismissal of
the retaliatory discharge action on the grounds of Sec. 301
pre-emption because "the same analysis of the facts" was
involved in both the tort action and the plaintiff's arbitration proceeding under the collective bargaining agreement.
Lingle, at 1879.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding:
[E]ven if dispute resolution pursuant to
a collective-bargaining agreement, on the
one hand, and state law on the other, would
require addressing precisely the same set
of facts, as long as the state-law claim
can be resolved without interpreting the
agreement itself, the claim is "independent"
of the agreement for Section 301 pre-emption
purposes.
Of particular relevance to the present case, the Lingle
court stated:
Section 301 does not pre-empt state antidiscrimination laws, even though a suit
under these laws, like a suit alleging
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retaliatory discharge, requires a state
court to determine whether just cause existed
to justify the discharge. The [Court of
Appeals] distinguished those laws because
Congress has affirmatively endorsed state
anti-discrimination remedies in Title VII...
whereas there is no such explicit endorsement
of state worker's compensation laws.... [T]his
distinction is unnecessary for determining
whether Sec. 301 pre-empts the state law in
question. The operation of the anti-discrimination laws does, however, illustrate the
relevant point for Sec. 301 pre-emption
analysis that the mere fact that a broad
contractual protection against discrimination -or retaliatory — discharge may provide a remedy
for conduct that coincidentally violates state
law does not make the existence or the contours
of the state Law violation dependent upon the
terms of the private contract. For even if an
arbitrator should conclude that the contract
does not prohibit a particular discriminatory
or retaliatory discharge, that conclusion might
or might not be consistent with a proper interpretation of state law. In the typical case,
a state tribunal could resolve either a discriminatory or retaliatory discharge claim
without interpreting the "just cause" language
of a collective bargaining agreement. Lingle,
at 1885 (citations deleted).
Plaintiff submits that Lingle effectively disposes of
Defendants' Sec. 301 pre-emption argument with respect to
Plaintiff's claim for wrongful termination in violation of
public policy.
With respect to Plaintiff's tort claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, it is well established that
such claims are not pre-empted by Section 301 where the
alleged emotional distress either is unrelated to employment
discrimination, or arises from the particularly abusive manner
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15
in which such discrimination is performed.

Defendants con-

ceded this point on page 17 of their Reply Memorandum (R. 285).
However, Defendants assert that "The alleged discrimination
does not rise to the level of being particularly abusive...."
Plaintiff submits that the allegations contained within her
Affidavit (R. 209-220), are sufficient to at least create an
issue of fact as to whether Defendants' conduct was "particularly abusive".

Moreover, Plaintiff has not had an opportunity

to fully develop the facts of this case, due to its summary
dismissal by the District Court.

Placos v. Cosmair, Inc.,

517 F. Supp. 1287, 1290 (D. N.Y., 1981).
Plaintiff's tort claim for negligent employment also
arises entirely from independent state law.

Utah has long

recognized a distinctive tort action for negligent employment.
Stone v.Hurst Lumber Co., 386 P.2d 910 (Utah 1963).

The neg-

ligence which is alleged by Plaintiff in this case is not
AT&T's negligence in carrying out its contractual obligations
under the collective bargaining agreement, but in allowing
the individual Defendants to violate the state law and policy

15
Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290,
305 (1977); Keehr v. Consolidated Freightways, 825 F,2d 133,
137 (7th Cir., 1987); Veal v. Kerr-McGee Coal Corp., 682 F.
Supp. 957, 962 (D. 111. 1988); Paradis v. United Technology,
672 F. Supp. 67, 70 (D. Conn. 1987).
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which prohibits employment discrimination and retaliation.
Resolution of this claim requires consideration of the scope
of the state policy against employment discrimination, and
the application of common-law principles of negligence.

It

does not require any reference to the collective bargaining
agreement.
In an attempt to tie Plaintiff's state law claim for
negligent employment to an analysis of the collective
bargaining agreement, Defendants assert on page 18 of their
Memorandum (R. 72), that:
In order to decide the negligent retention claim,
it must be determined whether AT&T acted appropriately in dealing with Gailey, Johnson, and
Randall. Since the negligent retention claim is
dependent upon a consideration of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, that claim is pre-empted by
federal law.
The present case does not require a determination of
whether AT&T acted appropriately in "dealing" with the individual Defendants, because AT&T did not take any action toward
the individual Defendants.

The fact is that AT&T made no

effort to stop the retaliation, despite repeatesd complaints
by Plaintiff. Having failed to utilize its right to discipline
the individual Defendants, AT&T should not now be allowed to
invoke the disciplinary procedures of the collective bargaining agreement as a bar to Plaintiff's state law claims.
Defendants' memoranda contain numerous rote assertions
that determination of Plaintiff's state law claims would
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require an analysis of the collective bargaining agreement,
but provide no indication of how or why such an analysis may
be necessary.
Plaintiff's breach of contract claim arises from AT&T's
breach of its independent contractual obligation under the
terms of the Code of Conduct, and has no reference to the collective bargaining agreement.

It is well established that

the existence of a collective bargaining agreement does not
in and of itself preclude the formation of an independent
employment contract.

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 107 S.Ct.

2425 (1987); Malia v. RCA Corp. 794 F.2d 909 (3rd. Cir. 1986);
Transportation-Communication Employees v. Grand Trunk RR, 679
F.Supp 696 (D. Mich. 1988); Whipple v. Independent School
Dist. , 424 NW 2d 559 (Minn. App. 1988). Only those independent contracts which are inconsistent with the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement are pre-empted.
16
Inc. v. Williams at 2432.

Caterpillar,

16
The only case cited by Defendants which discusses this
issue is Eitmann v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc.,
730 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1984). Eitmann recognizes
the general rule that only independent contracts
which are inconsistent with the terms of a collective bargaining agreement are pre-empted under
Sec. 301. Eitmann at 361. However, in Eitmann
the alleged independent contract was held to be
inconsistent with the collective bargaining agreement, and was, therefore, pre-empted.
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Defendants have made no claim that the provisions
within the Code of Conduct prohibiting sexual harassment and
retaliation are inconsistent with any term of the collective
bargaining agreement.

Moreover, determination of Plaintiff's

claim for breach of contract does not require an analysis of
the collective bargaining agreement.

The Code of Conduct

contains no reference to the collective bargaining agreement,
nor does the collective bargaining agreement refer to the
Code of Conduct.
dent remedy —

The Code of Conduct establishes an indepen-

AT&T's EEO Office —

which is not provided

for or even referred to within the collective bargaining
agreement.

The Code of Conduct contains no reference to

the LMRA, although it does contain a section on "Laws Affecting Our Business."

(R. 137).

Plaintiff twice initiated

charges with AT&T's EEO Office, pursuant to the Code of
Conduct, and the Union was not involved in either of those
proceedings (R. 210-214, 238-239).
On page 16 of their Reply Memorandum (R. 284), Defendants attempt to distinguish the authorities cited in support
of Plaintiff's independent contract claim on the grounds that
the individual contracts in the cases cited by Plaintiff
involved a "management position outside the bargaining
unit."

However, the distinction made by Defendants is not

apparent within the cases cited by Plaintiff.
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To the contrary,

in Caterpillar, Inc., v. Williams, 107 S. Ct., at 2436, the
court stated:
[A] plaintiff covered by a collectivebargaining agreement is permitted to
assert legal rights independent of
that agreement, including state-law
contract rights, so long as the contract
relied upon is not a collective-bargaining
agreement. (Emphasis in original).
Much of the discussion which occurs within the section
of Defendants' Memorandum which purports to address the issue
of Sec. 301 pre-emption of Plaintiff's breach of contract
claim, actually focuses upon the question of whether Plaintiff's breach of contract claim states a claim for relief.
Defendants' Memorandum at pages 16-17 (R. 70-71).

The

essence of Defendants' argument is that "The parties did
not intend for the Code of Contract to be an independent
agreement...."

However, the Defendants cited no facts in

support of this conclusion.

Plaintiff submits that a sub-

stantial issue of fact exists concerning whether the parties
intended the Code of Conduct to be an independent contract.
It is well established in Utah law that an employer's
employment manual or similar publication may give rise to an
implied contract of employment.

Berube at 1044-1046.

Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College. 636 P.2d 1063
(Utah 1981).

The existence of such an implied contract of

employment is a fact-intensive question, which requires
consideration of the entire circumstances of the employment*
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Summary Judgment is generally improper in an action which
alleges breach of an implied employment contract.
Plaintiff submits that if ever there were a case where
an employer's employment manual could give rise to an implied
contract, the present case is it.

The provisions within the

Code of Conduct which prohibit sexual harassment (R. 119),
and retaliation (R. 140), are mandatory and unequivocal.

The

Code of Conduct establishes a remedial process consisting of
AT&T's EEO Office (R. 119), which Plaintiff utilized on two
occasions.

(R. 210, 214). Plaintiff was required to review

and sign the Code of Conduct at the commencement of her
employment with AT&T and once per year thereafter. (R. 205).
Plaintiff believes that each employee of AT&T was required to
endorse the Code of Conduct on a yearly basis as a condition
of their continued employment.

(R. 205). There is no dis-

claimer of contractual obligation within the Code of Conduct.
Plaintiff submits that these facts are sufficient to create
a material issue as to whether the Code of Conduct gave rise
to an independent employment contract.
POINT V
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE
SECTION 301 LMRA STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OR
BY FAILURE TO EXHAUST CONTRACTUAL REMEDIES
Defendants argued within pages 20-22 of their Memorandum
(R. 74-76), that Plaintiff's claims are barred for failure to
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exhaust her remedies under the collective bargaining agreement.
Within pages 17-18 of their Reply Memorandum, Defendants argued
that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the 6-month Statute of
17
Limitations of LMRA Section 301.
Neither of these arguments is distinguishable from
Defendants' Section 301 pre-emption argument.

Section 301*3

6-month Statute of Limitations is not applicable in this case,
because Plaintiff has not made any claim under Section 301.
Taylor v. Tsekeris, 516 NW 2d 562 (111. App. 1981).

Plain-

tiff was not required to prove, or even allege exhaustion of
remedies because her claims do not arise from the Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
1284 (111. App. 1985).

Burgess v. Chicago Sun Times, 476 NE 2d
These arguments merely constitute a

reiteration of Defendants' Section 301 pre-emption argument,
and an attempt to create an issue involving analysis of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement where there is none.
POINT VI
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR NEGLIGENT EMPLOYMENT,
BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT, AND EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
ARE NOT BARRED BY LIMITATIONS
Defendants allege within page 22 of their Memorandum and
page 18-19 of their Reply Memorandum (R. 76, 286-287), that

17
Neither of these arguments was included within Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss of June 1, 1989 (R. 47-48), although they
are actually subsumed within Defendants1 Section 301 preemption argument.
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Plaintiff's claims for negligent employment, breach of contract,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress are barred by
limitations.

The parties agreed that these claims are governed

by the 4-year Statute of Limitations established by Utah Code
Annotated, Sec. 78-12-25(2) (R. 76).
Defendants misconstrue the date upon which the subject
claims accrued.

Defendants state within their Memorandum at

page 22 (R. 76), that:
Any claim of negligent retention, breach of
implied contract, or intentional infliction of
emotional distress, which Plaintiff arguably
had against Defendants accrued at the time
Plaintiff first was harassed or discriminated
against by Defendants.
Contrary to Defendants' assertion, Plaintiff's claims
for negligent employment, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and breach of contract did not accrue at the time
that Plaintiff "first was harassed or discriminated against".
Such claims accrued when the individual Defendants retaliated
against Plaintiff, after Plaintiff expressed her opposition to
Defendants' conduct to AT&T during approximately May of 1984.
In addition, Plaintiff's Affidavit and Verified Complaint
allege numerous specific incidents of retaliatory conduct,
which either constituted a continuing violation or a series
of independent torts.

Such conduct continued up until the

time of Plaintiff's termination from AT&T during March of
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1986, which is well within the limitations period.
18
Hilton Hotels, 689 F. Supp. at 1568.

Leong v.

POINT VII
PLAINTIFF HAS SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED A CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Plaintiff submits that the allegations contained within
her Verified Complaint and the facts set forth within her
Affidavit are more than sufficient to state a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress under the
standard set forth in Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344
(Utah, 1961).
POINT VIII
PLAINTIFF HAS SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED CLAIMS FOR
MALICIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
In regard to Plaintiff's claims for interference with
contract, Defendants argued that Bateson-Hough, as a management employee of AT&T, could not be liable for interfering
with a contract of AT&T.

(R. 78-79, 287-288).

18
The Statute of Limitations upon these claims should be
tolled during the pendency of Plaintiff's prior federal
court action, which was basically identical to the present action except for the addition of several federal
claims. Lee v. Grand Rapids Bd. of Ed., 389 NW 2d 165
(Mich. App., 1986). Plaintiff's prior federal court
action was filed on August 24, 1988, and was dismissed
due to limitations on March 11, 1989. (R. 105-113, 311).
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Plaintiff acknowledges the general principle that a
party cannot interfere with its own contract, and that this
principle generally extends to agents of the contracting
parties as well.

However, it is equally well established

that agents may be liable for interference where they act
out of purely personal motives, such as malice.

Plaintiff

cited several cases on this point which were not addressed
19
by Defendants. (R. 312-313).
The existence of a purely personal motive, such as
malice, is an issue of fact.

Placos at 1290; Lindsey v.

Dempsey, 735 P.2d 840, 845 (Ariz. App. 1984).

Defendants

asserted below that "Bateson-Hough was acting for and on
behalf of AT&T."

(R. 289). This is a factual assumption

which is not apparent from the record.

Plaintiff should be

allowed to inquire into Bateson-Hough*s motives for her
treatment of Plaintiff, as alleged within Plaintiff's
Affidavit.

(R. 214-215).

19
There have been numerous cases recognizing at cause of
action for interference with an employment contract by
co-workers, including management co-workers, in addition
to those cited within Plaintiff's memoranda. Placos v.
Cosmair, Inc., 517, at 1290; Treadwell v. John Hancock Co.,
666 F. Supp., at 290; Q E R, Inc. v. Hickerson, 880 F.2d
1178, 1184 (10th Cir. 1989); Sorrells v. Garfinkle's, et al,
565 A.2d 285 (D.C. App. 1989); McNamara v. City of Chicago,
700 F. Supp. 917, 920 (D. 111. 1988); Hobsort v. McLean
Hosp. Corp., 522 NE 2d 975 (Mass. 1988).
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Defendants' other argument concerning Plaintiff's
interference claims is that Plaintiff failed to allege
that Defendants "conspired with or persuaded another" to
interfere with the contract between Plaintiff and AT&T,
which allegation Defendants construe as being necessary to
state a cause of action for interference. (R. 80-82, 290).
Plaintiff submits that her Verified Complaint and
Affidavit do allege such conduct. (R. 209, 215). More
importantly, Plaintiff submits that it is not necessary
to allege that Defendants "conspired with or persuaded
another" to state a claim for interference.

The case of

Leigh Furniture v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982), contains
a lengthy discussion of the various interference torts, of
which one of the most salient points is the court's recognition that interference is a fluid concept which cannot be
pigeon-holed into a list of "elements".

Leigh Furniture at

301. See also 45 Am.Jur.2d, Interference, Sec. 1.

In fact,

the language which Defendants purported to quote from the
Leigh Furniture opinion within page 27 of their Memorandum
(R. 81), appears nowhere within the Leigh Furniture opinion.

C O N C L U S I O N
Plaintiff wishes to emphasize that Motions to Dismiss
and for Summary Judgment are generally disfavored in the law,
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because they preclude consideration of the merits of a plaintiff's claims«

Based upon the authorities and arguments set

forth herein, Plaintiff requests that this Honorable Court
reverse the Order of the District Court dismissing Plaintiff's
claims, and remand for further proceedings•
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